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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONALITY OF THE PROPOSED REGIONAL
PLAN FOR PROFESSIONAL EDUCATION OF THE
SOUTHERN NEGRO
When the Emancipation Proclamation and the Thirteenth Amendment
ended human slavery in the South, the problem of the readjustment of both
whites and Negroes to a new relationship between the races arose full-
blown. The problem, primarily a social one, was by its very nature incapable
of immediate solution. The Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments, pur-
porting to give the Negro equal legal status with the-whites, were adopted.
But equality in theory and equality in fact are different things, and generally
speaking, in the South the inferior position of the Negro has been recognized
and accepted by both races alike. However, the struggle for true equality has
never ceased. World War II has caused a general increase in agitation among
minorities the world over, and more and more the Negro has turned to the
courts to achieve the' equality which he has failed to attain by other means.'
When the struggle has reached the courts, it has centered about the Due Proc-
ess and Equal Protection clauses of the Fourteenth Amendment. Currently
the problem is receiving widespread attention in three specific situations: (1)
the right of the Negro to vote in Democratic primaries, 2 (2) the validity in
conveyances of land of covenants restricting alienation to Negroes, 3 and
(3) the education of the Negro, particularly on the professional and graduate
level.4
It is the purpose of this comment to consider the constitutional ques-
1. That this approach brings results, witness the fact that the suit brought by a
Negro seeking to require the University of Texas to admit him to its law school was a
major factor in causing the State of Texas to appropriate $3,000,000 for a Negro uni-
versity-an amount equal to one half the appropriation for all Negro Education in the
state during the last third of a century. Bullock, The Availability of Education in the
Texas Separate Schools, 16 J. OF NEGRO ED. 425, 432 (1947). Petitioner -in this case ap-
plied for admission to the University of Texas in February, 1946. He filed suit for a
writ of mandamus to compel his admission in May, 1946. The trial court issued an in-
terlocutory order allowing Texas six months in which to establish a law school for
Negroes substantially equal to that for whites. At the end of the period the trial court
held that such a school had been provided and denied the writ. Upon agreement of coun-
sel in open court the cause was remanded by the Court of Civil Appeals of Texas, and a
second order denying the writ, based upon specific 'findings by the court, was made by
the trial court in June, 1947. This order was affirmed on appeal. Sweatt v. Painter,
No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948).
2. Rice v. Elmore, 165 F. 2d 387 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
3. Four cases on this point were argued before the Supreme Court, January 15 and
16, 1948: Shelley v. Kraemer, No. 72; McGhee v. Sipes, No. 87; Hurd v. Hodge, No.
290; Urciolo v. Hodge, No. 291. 16 U. S. L. WEEK 3260 (Feb. 24, 1948).
4. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 68 Sup. Ct. 299 (1948)'.
403
VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
tions involved in current plans for establishing in the South regional schools
where Negroes may obtain a professional education. Politically and socially
the problem of Negro education is dynamic and dynamitic, r and no attempt
will be made here to discuss or argue the points involved from a sociological
point of view. Rather the purpose here is to consider the question from its
narrow legal aspect; social considerations will' be noticed only insofar as
may be necessary to the discussion of the legal problems.
THE PLAN FOR REGIONAL EDUCATION OF THE NEGRO
The governors of the various Southern States are now formulating a
most important project. Plans are being made to establish regional universi-
ties where the Negro 6 may obtain a professional education which has hither-
to generally been denied to him.7 The proponents of the plan feel that it will
afford a real educational opportunity for the Negro, and at the same time pre-
serve racial segregation without imposing an intolerable financial burden upon
the individual states.
Equal protection of the laws unquestionably requires equality of oppor-
tunity to the extent that substantially equal schools 8 be afforded.9 Since
many Southern states which have professional schools for whites do not have
5. The dynamite in the situation is abundantly evident from the Southern reaction to
To SECURE THESE RIGHTS: REPORT OF THE PRESIDENT'S COMMITTEE ON CIVIL RIGHTS
41947). For a study of the dynamics of the problem see JOHNSON ET AL., INTO THE MAIN
STREA : A SURVEY OF BEST PRACTICES IN RACE RELATIONS IN THE SOUTH (1947).
6. The- regional education plan contemplates the establishment of both white and
Negro schools for specialized and professional training. Nashville Banner, Mar. 5, 1948,
p. 1, col. 7. Acting President C. E. Brehm of the University of Tennessee has suggested
that the medical school of his university be made a regional institution. Nashville Ten-
nessean, March 31, 1948, p. 13, col. 3. Nowhere in the compact is there any reference to a
program for Negroes only; in fact there is no reference whatever to race anywhere in
the compact. Appendix, ifira. Since the existence of white regional schools would have no
direct effect upon the legal problems presented in setting up the Negro "chool," (that is,
so long as the present white state universities are maintained), this study is confined to
the regional plan for Negroes.
7. Seventeen states require segregation in their public schools. See note 12, infra.
In 1940 in these states one public Negro law school and one Negro school of library
science existed. There were no public schools in these states where Negroes could obtain
training at the professional level in medicine, dentistry, engineering or pharmacy. 2
NATIONAL SURVEY OF HIGHER EDUCATION FOR NEGROES 15 (1942) [cited, Brief for Ap-
pellant, p. 62, Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948)]. For a more recent
study of Negro opportunities in 15 Southern states and the District of Columbia, see
16 J. OF NEGRO ED. 311-438 (1947). On Negro Education generally, see MAxNc,1!, THE
LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO 78-137 (1940).
8. As to what amounts to substantial equality, see Claybrook v. Owensboro, 16
Fed. 297 (D. Ky. 1883) (proportionate number of teachers and length of terms must be
substantially the same) ; Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180. 126 Pac. 273 (1912) (Negro
may be required to walk a greater distance to his school than he would have to walk to
a white school) ; Reynolds v. Board of Education, 66 Kan. 672, 72 Pac. 274 (1903) (not
necessary that buildings be same size) ; Pearson v. Murray. 169 Md. 478, 182 AtI. 590
(1936) (courses of study must be substantially the same) ; Jones v. Board of Education,
90 Okla. 233, 217 Pac. 400 (1923) (physical facilities must be roughly proportionate to
the number of children attending). Examples of what is unfair are stated in United States
v. Buntin, 10 Fed. 730 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1882) (Negro may not be required to travel an
unreasonable or oppressive distance) ; Williams v. Board of Education, 79 Kan. 202. 99
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such schools for Negroes,'0 it will be necessary either to admit Negroes to
the existing white institutions or to establish new ones for the Negroes."
Certainly today the general sentiment in the South is that segregation is neces-
sary to preserve social order and to maintain satisfactory educational prog-
ress.' 2 If this sentiment is to be controlling, adequate schools for Negroes must
Pac. 216 (1908) (unfair to require Negro children to traverse dangerous area to reach
school) ; Jones v. Board of Education, supra, (unfair to provide only part-time facilities
for Negro children). See Note, 103 A. L. R. 713 (1936).
9. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 68 Sup. Ct 299 (1948) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; cf. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U. S. 356, 369 (1886) (the
equal protection of the laws is "a pledge of equal laws").
10. See note 7, supra.
11. Gov. Jim Nance McCord of Tennessee, one of the foremost sponsors of the
regional education plan, speaking before the Conference of Southern Governors in
Asheville, N. C., October 20, 1947, pointed out three possible alternatives for the South:
(1) close the white professional schools; (2) admit Negroes to the white schools; (3)
establish for Negroes separate schools of equal educational rank. Nashville Banner, Oct.
20, 1947, p. 10, col. 4.
12. Seventeen states require segregation of the races in schools. In some instances
the requirement is a constitutional one; in others it is statutory, and in many states it is
both. ALA. CONsT. Art. XIV, § 256, ALA. CODE, tit. 52, § 93 (1940); A E. DiG. STAT.§ 11535 (c) (Pope, 1937) ; DEL. CONsT. Art. X, § 2, DEL. REV. CODE, c. 71, § 2631 (1935) ;
FLA. CONST. Art XII, § 12, FLA. STAT. ANN. § 228.09 (1943); GA. CoNsT. Art. VIII,
§ 1, GA. CODE ANN., tit. 32, § 937 (Supp. 1947) ; Ky. CoNsT. § 187, Ky. REv. STAT. ANN.
§ 158.020 (Baldwin, 1943); LA. CONST. Art. XII, § 1; MD. CODE GEN. LAws art. 77,
§ 192 (Flack, 1939) ; Miss. CoNsT. Art. VIII, § 207, Miss. CODE ANN. § 6276 (1942) ;.
Mo. CoNsT. Art. XI, § 3, Mo. REv. STAT. ANN. § 10349 (1943); N. C. CONST. Art. IX,
§ 2, N. C. GEN. STAT. § 115-2 (1943); OKLA. CoNsT. Art. I, § 5, OKLA. STAT., tit. 70,
§ 451 (1941) ; S. C. CONST. Art. XI, § 7, S. C. CODE § 5377 (1942); TENN. CONST. Art.
XI, § 12, TENN. CODE ANN. § 2377 (Williams, 1934); TEx. Coi'sT. Art. VII, § 7,
TEX. REv. Civ. STAT., tit. 49, art. 2900, (Vernon, 1942) ; VA. CONST. Art. IX, § 140, VA.
CODE ANN., tit. 11, c. 33, § 680 (1942) ; W. VA. CoNsT. Art. XII, § 8, W. VA. CODE ANN.§ 1775 (1943).
For a very complete chart analyzing constitutional and statutory provisions for
separate schools in the South, see Johnson & Lucas, The Present Legal Status of the
Negro Sepaiate School, 16 J. oF NEGRO ED. 280, 286-288 (1947). The position of the
Negro student in all states is discussed in MANGUM, THE LEGAL STATUS OF THE NEGRO
78-86 (1940).
A good statement of the views of the moderate Southerner is that made by four
Southern members of the President's Commission on Higher Education (Arthur H.
Compton, Chancellor, Washington University, St. Louis; Douglas S. Freeman, Editor,
Richmond Times-Dispatch; Lewis W. Jones, President, University of Arkansas; and
Goodrich C. White, President, Emory University). The majority report of this Com-
mittee had recommended that segregation in schools be ended. The four members of the
28-man committee said by way of dissent:
. "The undersigned wish to record their dissent from the Commission's pro-
nouncements on 'segregation,' especially as these pronouncements are related to
education in the South. We recognize that many conditions affect adversely the
lives of our Negro citizens, and that gross inequality of opportunity, economic and,
educational, is a fact. We are concerned that as rapidly as possible conditions should
be improved, inequalities removed, and greater opportunity provided for all our
people. But we believe that efforts toward these ends must, in the South, be made
within the established patterns of social relationships, which require separate in-
stitutions for whites and Negroes. We believe that pronouncements such as these
of the Commission on the question of segregation jeopardize these efforts, impede
progress, and threaten tragedy to the people of the South, both white and Negro.
We recognize the high purpose and the theoretical idealism of the Commission's
recommendations. But a doctrinaire position which ignores the facts of history and
the realities of the present is not one that will contribute constructively to the so-
lution of difficult problems of human relationships." PRESIDENT'S COMMISSION oNl
HIGHER EDUCATION, HIGHER EDUCATION FOR AMERICAN DE.iocRAcy, Vol. II, p. 29
(1947).
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be established. The fact that there may be only a very few Negro students who
would avail themselves of the opportunity of attending these schools in no way
affects the right of those few to have the opportunity. 13 Makeshift, second-rate
schools will not do. If the state university offers whites a full three-year
course in law, the state must provide an equal course for Negroes.' 4 It would
take as many capable faculty members to give an entire course to a class of
ten as it would to a class of 100. The financial burden thus imposed would
seriously impair the state's finances or result in a general lowering of educa-
tional efficiency through decreased appropriations to existing schools. 1 The
way out, as suggested by the plan, is the pooling of resources on a regional
scale.
The machinery by which this regional cooperation would be carried out
is a compact among the states concerned.' 6 A 15-state compact is contemplated.
Governor Millard Caldwell of Florida is head of an executive committee which
will undertake a study aimed to produce a detailed program. Both the Car-
negie Foundation and the General Education Board have been asked to help
finance the study, and appropriations from state contingent funds have been
made to allow it to begin.17
Interstate compacts are not unusual, though they have not heretofore
been employed for educational purposes.' 8 The Constitution requires that such
compacts have the consent of Congress.' 9 The management and administra-
13. In McCabe v. Atchinson, Topeka & S. F. Ry. Co., 235 U. S. 151, 161-162 (1914),
the Court, in discussing the argument that limited demand justified lack of opportunity, de-
clared that such a doctrine made the constitutional right "depend upon the number of
persons who may be discriminated against, whereas the essence of the constitutional right
is that it is a personal one. Whether or not particular facilities shall be provided may
doubtless be conditioned upon there being a reasonable demand therefor; but, if facilities
are provided, substantial equality of treatment of persons traveling under like conditions
cannot be refused. It is the individual who ,is entitled to the equal protection of the
laws. .. "14. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 68 Sup. Ct. 299 (1948) ; Missouri ex rel. Gaines v.
Capada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938) ; Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936).
15. For statistics on the cost of supplying truly equal and separate facilities for the
Southern Negro, see Wirth, The Prie of Prejudice, 36 SuRvEY GRaPHIC 19, 20 (Jan.
1947).
16. .The text of this compact is set out in full, infra p. 421, as an appendix to this com-
merit.
17. Nashville Banner, Mar. 5, 1948, p. 1, col. 7.
18. See Dodd, Interstate Compacts, 70 U. S. L. REv. 557, 574-78 (1936); Frank-
furter and Landis, The Compact Clause of the Constitution--A Study in Interstate Ad.
justments, 34 YALE L. J. 685, 696 (1925) ; Murphy, The Interstate Compact to Conserve
Oil and Gas: An Experiment in Cooperative State Production Control, 17 Miss. L. J.
314 (1946) ; Note, Regional Education: A New Use of the Interstate Compact? 34 VA.
L. REV. 64 (1948).
19. U. S. CoxsT. ART. I, § 10, cl. 3. This provision was inserted into the Constitution
to safeguard the new Union from destructive political combinations among the states.
Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 18, at 693. It has been suggested that Congressional
consent is not necessary where the compact does not affect the states in their relations
with the Federal Government. See Virginia v. Tennessee, 148 U. S. 503, 518 (1893);
Carman, Should the States be Permitted to Make Compacts without the Consent of
Congress? 23 CoRN. L. Q. 280 (1938) ; Dutton, Compacts and Trade Barriers, 16 InD
L. J. 204 (1940); Murphy, supra note 18, at 317. If any compacts do not require the
assent of Congress it would seem that an agreement concerning education would surely
COMMENTS 40?
tion of the interstate projects vary with the provisions of the compacts and
the nature of the subject matter.20 The regional education compact provides
that the regional schools will be regulated by a joint Board of Control repre--
senting all of the participating states, and supported by tax contributions from
all of these states. 21 Such a scheme necessarily raises problems of administra-
tion and control which will require considerable thought and careful exe-
cution if the regional university is to represent a real advance in educational
opportunities of Negroes or whites. 22 And, quite apart from the technical dif-
ficulties of its administration, the plan raises two fundamental constitutional
questions which need to be clarified before the regi6nal universities' for Ne-
groes may be developed to their maximum potentiality. These two questions
are: (1) Is segregation in public educational facilities constitutional? (2) Will
regional schools for Negroes satisfy the equal protection clause if the in-
dividual states retain their state universities for whites only?
THE CONSTITUTIONALITY OF SEGREGATION IN EDUCATION 
2 3
That segregation, if accompanied by equality of separate facilities, is
not a violation of the equal protection of the laws was decided by the Supreme
Court in Plessy v. Fergusoll 24 in 1896. That case involved a Louisiana statute
which required that all railways carrying passengers in the state should
maintain equal and separate facilities for whites and colored people, and made
it a misdemeanor for a member of one race to insist upon going into the coaches
set aside for the other. The statute was attacked as violative of both the
Thirteenth and Fourteenth Amendments. The Court found little basis for
argument as to the Thirteenth, Amendment, and confined its main discussion
to the equal protection clause.
"The object of the [Fourteenth] amendment was undoubtedly to enforce the ab-
solute equality of the two races before the law, but in'the nature of things it could
not have been intended to abolish distinctions based upon color, or to enforce social,
fall within that class, since education is traditionally a matter of state, as distinguished
from federal, concern.
20. Dodd, supra, note 18; Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 18.
21. Appendix, infra, l f 5, 9.
22. Editor C. A. Scott, of the Atlanta Daily World, speaking of this point, declared
that the regional school would be "a sort of monstrosity that would be evqrybody's busi-
ness and in the end nobody's business." Quoted in Note, Regional Education: A New Use
of the Interstate Compact? 34 VA. L, REv. 64, 75, n. 66 (1948). The Port of New York
Authority is an example of a somewhat similar plan which has worked quite successfully.
A good example of the difficulties attendant upon interstate cooperation in a different
type of situation is found in Murphy, supra note 18, at 323, n. 24.
23. This question has recently been considered in Note, Segregation in Public Schools
-A Violation of "Equal Protection of the Laws;" 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947). The
writer of this note develops the thesis that compulsory segregation necessarily implies
social inferiority, and that it is, therefore, a denial of equal protection. The argument is
primarily a social one, rather than an analysis of the legal principles involved. See
also, Johnson & Lucas, The Present Legal Status of the Negro Separate School, 16
J. oF NEGRO ED. 280 (1947).
24. 163 U. S. 537 (1896).
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as distinguished from political equality, or a commingling of the two races upon terms
unsatisfactory to either. Laws permitting, and even requiring, their separation in
places where they are liable to be brought into contact do not necessarily imply the
inferiority of either race to the other, and have been generally, if not universally,
recognized as within the competency of the state legislatures in the exercise of their
police power. The most common instance of this is connected with the establishment
of separate schools for white and colored children, which has been held to be a
valid exercise of the legislative power even by courts of States where the political
rights of the colored race have been longest and most earnestly enforced." 25
The Court further declared that separation in railway coaches is no more
"obnoxious to the Fourteenth Amendment... than requiring separate schools
for colored children . . . . the constitutionality of which does not seem to
have been questioned .... ,, 26 The opinion concluded with a statement that
equality does not necessarily mean identity, and that the Constitution cannot
abolish social inequality.2
7
Thus, although the Plessy case had nothing to do with educational segre-
gation, it assumes the validity of segregation in schools and uses this assump-
tion as one basis for extending the doctrine of separate but equal facilities into
another field. In tuin, cases which do face the issue of segregation in public
schools 28 cite the holding in the Plessy case as authority for extending the
doctrine from the field of transportation into that of education. Thus a pe-
culiar sort of judicial doubleplay has resulted. Taken together, the reasoning
of the courts which follow this pattern has been: (1) we assume that segre-
gation in schools is constitutional because it has not been questioned-there-
fore it follows by analogy that segregation in railroad coaches is permissible;
(2) since segregation in railroad coaches is permissible, it reasonably follows
that sekregations in schools is not improper. This circuitous reasoning detracts
from the authority, and the court could rule that segregation in public schools
is discrimination without overruling the holding in the Plessy case. 29
25. Id. at 544.
26. Id. at 551.
27. "Ie consider the underlying fallacy of the plaintiff's argument to consist in the
assumption that the enforced separation of the two races stamps the colored race with a
badge of inferiority.... The argument also assumes that social prejudices may be over-
come by legislation, and that equal rights cannot be secured to the negro except by an
enforced commingling of the two races. We cannot accept this proposition. If the two races
are to meet on terms of social equality, it must be the result of natural affinities, a mutual
appreciation of each other's merits and a voluntary consent of individuals .... Legisla-
tion is powerless to eradicate racial instincts or to abolish distinctions based upon physical
differences, and the attempt to do so can only result in accentuating the difficulties of the
present situation. ... If one race be inferior to the other socially, the Constitution of the
United States cannot put them upon the same plane." Id. at 551-552.
28. E.g., Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912) ; Graham v. Board
of Education, 153 Kan. 840, 114 P. 2d 313 (1941) ; Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182
At. 590 (1936); State e.x rel. Michael v. Witham, 179 Tenn. 250, 165 S. W. 2d 378
(1942); Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948).
29. The writer in Note, 56 YALE L. J. 1059 (1947), reaches the ingenious conclusion
that the rationale of the Plessy case becomes authority for the doctrine that segregation
per se is a denial of equal protection. This conclusion is said to follow from the substi-
tution of a proper premise for the erroneous one upon which the court based its decision.
Id. at 1066.
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Other than the Plessy holding there is only one sphere of activity in which
the Supreme Court has directly upheld the validity of segregation by state or
federal action-the wartime separation of Japanese-Americans. 30 On the
other hand the court has struck down state statutes which imposed residential
segregation by means of legislation prohibiting Negroes from owning or oc-
cupying property in particular areas. 31 The denial of equal protection is
clearer in these cases however. Such a statute denying to whites the right to
own or occupy property in any given area would also be discriminatory, since
it would deny to one citizen a right granted to another. The discrimination
in such a case would arise not from any claim that an inferior status resulted
from segregation (the argument commonly advanced against segregated
schools) 32 but that it is unfair and illegal to grant to one citizen the right to
acquire private property in a given area while denying that right to another
citizen solely on the basis of his race. Private covenants establishing segre-
gated or restricted areas have been upheld by th Court on the ground that
the Fourteenth Amendment does not reach to individual action in which the
state does not participate.33 This holding is now being attacked upon the
ground that court enforcement of such covenants amounts to state action.3 4
Although the Supreme Court has never squarely faced the question of
the constitutionality of segregation in public schools, it has, as already in-
dicated, tacitly accepted such- a doctrine. In Gong Lurn v. Rice 35 the Court
pointed out that separate schools had long been maintained by Congress in
the District of Columbia, and accepted this as an indication that segregation
was proper. In Cumming v. B6ard of Education 36 the Court allowed a school
board to use funds to operate a white high school, although no high school for
Negfoes existed. The Court has even sustained the validity of a prosecution
by a state of an incorporated private school for violation of a segregation
30. Ex Parte Endo, 323 U. S. 283 (1944) ; Korematsu v. United States, 323 U. S.214 (1944); Hirabayashi v. United States, 320 U. S. 81 (1943); see The Alien Land
Laws: A Reappraisal, 56 YALE L. J. 1017 (1947).
31,. Harmon v.' Tyler, 273 U. S. 668 (1927); Buchanan v. Warley, 245 U. S. 60(1917), The ground of the Buchanan decision was due process rather than equal pro-
tection. See Field, The Constitutionality of Segregation Ordinances, 5 VA. L. REv. 81(1917); Martin, Segregation of Residences of Negroes,.32 MicH. L. REv. 721 (1934).32. Note, 56 YALE L. 3. 1059 (1947) contains citations to a number of treatises and
articles which argue this point. "The only premise on which racial separation can bebased is that the inferiority and the undesirability of the race set apart make its segrega-
tion mandatory in the interest of the well-being of society as a whole. Hence the very
act of segregation is a rejection of our constitutional axiom of racial equality." Brief for
Appellant, p. 35, Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948).
33. Corrigan v. Buckley, 271 U. S. 323 (1926); Wyatt v. Adair, 215 Ala. 363, 110
So. 801 (1926) ; Los Angeles Investment Co. v. Gary, 181 Cal. 680, 186 Pac. 596 (1919) ;Queensborough Land Co. v. Cazeaux, 136 La. 724, 67 So. 641 (1915); Parmalee v.
Morris, 218 Mich. 625, 188 N. MT. 330 (1922) ; Martin, supra note 31, at 731; see Notes,
9 A. L. R. 120 (1920), 38 A. L. R. 1185 (1925), 42 A. L. R. 1273 (1926).
34. See note 3, supra.
35. 275 U. S. 78 (1927).
36. 175 U. S. 528 (1899).
410 VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW
statute.37 And in Missovri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada 38 the Court remarked
by way of dictum that the' validity of separate but equal facilities had been
"sustained by our decisions." 39 In addition to these cases there are numerous
state decisions squarely upholding the constitutionality of separate but equal
schools. 40
It would seem that the great number of decisions which either squarely
uphold or incidentally accept the proposition that segregation in education is
not discrimination would erase any doubt as to the result were the precise
question to be presented to the Court. But even stronger precedent has fallen
in recent years.41 The ghost of stare "decisis wanders uneasily among the
gravestones of overruled Supreme Court cases.42 The tendency of the Court
is ever toward a recognition of factual results, rather than theoretical legal
relations, as the test of the constitutionality of a particular practice or sta-
tute.43 For example, in Rice v. Elmore 44 a federal court found that the Demo-
cratic party primary, conducted solely by the party's own rules and totally
unregulated by any state statute, is state action as comprehended by the
Fourteenth Amendment. The court saw that, as a matter of fact, proscrip-
tion of Negroes by the Democratic party effectively denied the Negro any
opportunity to participate in the selection of state officials; having ascertained
this fact the court formulated a rationale which would allow it to remedy this
denial of a constitutional right. True, this was not a Supreme Court decision,
but it follows the pattern set in election cases by the Supreme Court,4 5 and
37. Beiea College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45 (1908). The decision in this case was
arrived at upon the theory that the state had the right to alter, amend, or repeal a cor-
porate charter. The case does not stand for the proposition that a state can require a
private individual to segregate races.
38. 305 U. S. 337, (1938).
39. Id. at 344.
40. Ward v. Flood, 48 Cal. 36 (1874); Cory v. Carter, 48 Ind. 327 (1874) ; Lehew
v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W. 765 (1891); People ex rel. King v. Gallagher, 93
N. Y. 438 (1883) ; State ex rel. Garnes v. McCann, 21 Ohio St. 198 (1871). Also see
cases note 28, supra.
41. E.g., Swift v. Tyson, 16 Pet. 1 (U. S. 1842), which established a doctrine
uniformly followed for nearly a hundred years, was overruled by the celebrated case of
Erie R. R. Co. v. Tompkins, 304 U. S. 64 (1938).
42. In the period between 1937 and 1944 no less than fourteen Supreme Court
decisions were expressly overruled by the Court. See Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649,
665, n. 10, for a list of these cases. Mr. Justice Roberts, dissenting in Sinith v. Allkright,
supra, said: "the instant decision, overruling that announced about nine years ago [Grovey
v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935)], tends to bring adjudications of this tribunal into the
same class as a restricted railroad ticket, good for this day and train only. I have no
assurance, in view of current decisions, that the opinion announced today may not shortly
be repudiated and overruled by justices who deem they have new light on the subject.
." Id. at 669-670.
43. "The federal courts have shown a mounting reluctance to swallow prejudice
preserved in precedent." The Alien Land Laws: A Reappraisal, 56 YALE L. J. 1017 (1947).
44. 165 F. 2d 387 (C. C. A. 4th 1947).
45. This pattern has consistd of a series of decisions which have inexorably struck
down successive schemes to prevent Negroes from voting in the Democratic primaries.
In Newberry .v. United States, 256 U. S. 232 (1921), the Court held that the term "elec-
tion" as used in the Constitution referred only to final elections, and that the constitu-
tional guarantees would not reach to primaries. This doctrine was repudiated in United
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an analogy may be found in the decision which upheld a statute forbidding la-
bor unions to refuse to accept qualified Negroes as members.4 6 The same tend-
ency to look at facts rather than theory is evidenced in cases where the Court
has found that due process of law has been denied to Negroes who. were in-
dicted and convicted by juries composed exclusively of whites; the Court has
been less impressed by the absence of any rule excluding Negroes than it has by
the fact that for periods of years no Negro actually has served on the juries.4 7
In 1877 the Court ruled that a Louisiana statute which forbade segrega-
tion on ships and boats operating within the state was unconstitutional as an
attempt by the state tq regulate interstate commerce. 48 In 1946 the court used
the same reasoning to strike down a statute of Virginia which required such
segregation.49 The rule of law in the two cases is the same; the factual result
reached is exactly opposite. It may or may not be significant that it was the
later case which resulted in the legal destruction of the color line in a limited
sphere of activity. This result may be a mere accident of chronology, but
when the Morgan case is considered with the more recent Bob-Lo case,50 the
temper of the Court is clearly shown. In this latter case the Court upheld the
constitutionality of a Michigan statute which applied anti-segregation rules
to an excursion boat operating between Detroit and a Canadian island. The
Court pointed out that as a practical matter the boat operated between Detroit
and an island which, though politically a part of Canada, was actually a resort
States v. Classic, 313 U. S. 299 (1941), a case which did not involve Negroes. Statutes
prohibiting Negroes from voting in Democratic primaries were declared unconstitutional
in Nixon v. Herndon, 273 U. S. 536 (1927), and Nixon v. Condon, 286 U. S. 73 (1932).
Grovey v. Townsend, 295 U. S. 45 (1935), held that Negroes could be barred from the
primary by party action. This was overruled by Smith v. Allwright, 321 U. S. 649 (1944).
The decision in this last case was based upon the fact that some Texas statutes did relate
to the Democratic primary, and this was found to constitute state action as comprehended
by the Fifteenth Amendment. The Elmore case finds -state action to exist in the absolute
absence of any statutory mention of primaries.
See Cushman, The Texas "White Primary" Case-Smith v. Allwright, 30 CoRN.
L. Q. 66 (1944) ; also 20 IND. L. J. 179 (1945). For a discussion of the situation before
the Allwright case, see Weeks, The White Primary, 8 Miss. L. J. 135 (1935).
46. Railway Mail Association v. Corsi, 326 U. S. 88 (1945) ; cf. Steele v. Louisville
& Nashville R. Co., 323 U. S. 192 (1944) (in absence of a statute requiring it to accept
Negro members, a "white' union must, if it is the duly certified representative of a class
of workers, protect the rights of non-member Negroes who are affected by the acts of
the union).
47. It is a denial of equal protection to exclude Negroes from a jury which has
indicted or tried a Negro. Hill v. Texas, 316 U. S. 400 (1942) ; Smith v. Texas, 311 U. S.
128 (1940) ; Carter v. Texas, 177 U. S. 442 (1900); Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U..
S. 303 (1880). Exclusion in fact over a long period will be sufficient to quash an indict-
ment or reverse a conviction, even though there is no law calling for exclusion. "We
think that the evidence that for a generation or longer no negro had been called for
service on any jury in Jackson County . . . established the discrimination which the
Constitution forbids." Norris v. Alabama, 294 U. S. 587, 596 (1935). "When a jury se-
lection plan, whatever it is, operates in such a way as always to result in the complete and
long-continued exclusion... of negroes .... indictments and verdicts ... cannot stand."
Patton v. Mississippi, 68 Sup. Ct. 184, 187 (1947).
48. Hall v. DeCuir, 95 U. S. 485 (1877).
49. Morgan v. Virginia, 328 U. S. 373 (1946).
50. Bob-Lo Excursion Co. v. People, 68 Sup. Ct. 358 (1948).
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area for Detroit. Canada apparently exercised no active dominion over the
island. The question is suggested: Would the Court still uphold the statute if
Canada were suddenly to asstime active supervision over the island, and pass
a segregation statute? The Court answers this question by saying that such a
possibility is too remote to be taken into account. This disregard of the two
jurisdictions involved is contrary to the reasoning which supported the Morgan
decision. But the two cases are perfectly consistent as to the factual results
obtained: in both instances it was held that segregation of races would not be
allowed. True, the M1lorgan and Bob-Lo cases are not authority for the proposi-
tion that segregation is unconstitutional; both cases arose under the commerce
clause. They do, however, reflect a significant attitude on the part of the present
Supreme Court. ,
What will the Court hold when the issue of racial segregation in education
is squarely presented to it? Undoubtedly the Court is aware that a ruling that
such segregation is unconstitutional would produce a inajor upheaval in the
South. The Court's conduct in cases before it in recent years makes it clear
that the Court will not rule on the problem until it is squarely presented. 51
The Sipuel case 52 was intended to present the issue, but the Court treated it
as an exact replica of the Gaines case 53 and disposed of the question in one
paragraph. In the later hearing of the Sipuel case the Court remarked that the
constitutionality of segregation had not been presented in either case.5 4 In
Morgan v. Virginia 55 it was not necessary to mention the point, but Mr.
Justice Burton, dissenting, did remark that "The issue is . . . [not] the con-
stitutionality of racial segregation as such." 56 Similar statements were made
in the Cuimning 57 and Berea College 58 cases. It is not a simple matter to get
the issue before the Court. In the Sipuel case the Court ruled that the petitioner
had been denied equal protection because clearly there was no equality where
a white law school existed but no similar school was available to Negroes. The
Oklahoma state court to which the case was remanded ordered the Board of
Regents of the University of Oklahoma to establish a separate school for
51. The precise issue was met by a federal district court in Mendez v. Westminster
School Dist., 64 F. Supp. 544 (S. D. Cal. 1946). The court ruled that the arbitrary
assignment of Mexican children to separate schools was a violation of the equal protection
clause. The Circuit Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit affirmed the order of the
district court, but the affirmance was based solely on the ground that segregation was
contrary to California statutes, and that the federal courts have jurisdiction to prevent
unequal application of state statutes. Thus the basic constitutional issue was avoided.
Westminster School Dist. v. Mendez, 161 F. 2d 774 (C. C. A. 9th 1947).
52. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 68 Sup. Ct. 299 (1948).
53. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337 (1938).
54. Fisher v. Hurst, 68 Sup. Ct. 389 (1948)
55. 328 U. S. 373 (1946).
56. Id. at 389.
57. "But we need not consider that question in this case. No such issue was made in
the pleadings."' Cumming y. Board of Education, 175 U. S. 528, 543 (1899).
58. "No such question is here presented and it need not now be discussed." Berea
College v. Kentucky, 211 U. S. 45, 69 (1908) (dissenting opinion).
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Negroes. A petition for mandamus to require the University of Oklahoma to
admit the petitioner to its law school was denied on the ground that the
Oklahoma court must first determine whether the order of the Supreme
Court has been obeyed. 59 If the case goes back up through the state
courts on the ground that the new Negro school is not in fact equal to the
white school, then the United States Court may still hold that equal protection
has been denied to the petitioner, without considering the segregation issue.
The case of Sweatt v. Painter 60 may present the question to the Court
before the Sipuel case does so. In the Sweatt case the petitioner, a Negro, is
seeking admission to the law school of the University of Texas on the ground
that a separate school for Negroes cannot possibly meet the requirements of
equal protection.6 1 Texas has appropriated $3,000,000 to establish the Negro
school, and in the interim period has arranged for the regular law faculty of
the University of Texas to give the standard courses to Negro students.6 2
Library facilities in excess of those required by the American Bar Association
and equal to those required by the Association of American Law Schools were
made available.63 Nevertheless, the petitioner refused to apply for admission
to this Negro school, on the ground that he has a constitutional right to attend
the established law school of the state university. The Court of Civil Appeals
of Texas has held that the Negro school is substantially equal to the white
school, and in doing so remarked that "Implicit in these quotations [from
petitioner's brief] is the assertion that race segregation in public schools, at
least in the higher and professional fields, inherently is discriminatory within
the meaning of the fourteenth amendment and cannot be made otherwise." 64
The court also states "that the validity of state laws which require segregation
of races in state supported schools, as being, on the ground of segregation
alone, a denial of due process, 65 is not now an open question." 66 The court
59. Fisher v. Hurst, 68 Sup. Ct. 398 (1948).
60. No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948).
61. "Appellant does not seek to have appellees establish a separate school for Negroes
with facilities equal to those at the University of Texas because appellant contends, as
indicated infra, that 'equality is determined not by physical identity of things or facilities
furnished, but by the identity or substantial similarity of their values-in short, by the
community judgment attached to them.' There can be no question that a segregated law
school for Negroes has a very low value in the eyes of every community since the purpose
is to segregate a group which Texans have been led to believe is inferior." Brief for
Appellant, pp. 42-43, Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948).
62. A somewhat similar arrangement has been made at the University of Arkansas.
There a single Negro student has been admitted into the law school, but he studies and
has classes apart from the white students. Nashville Tennessean, Jan. "31, 1948, p. 2,
col. 1-2.
63. Sweatt v. Painter, No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948) (p. 2 of appendix by court).
,64. Id. at p. 3 of opinion.
65. The court discusses the problem throughout as a question of due process; the
brief for appellant was phrased entirely in terms of equal protection.
66. Sweatt v. Painter, supra, note 60, at p. 1 of opinion.
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then quotes at length from Plessy v. Ferguson, thus completing the reasoning
pattern described above.67
Whatever the decision of the Supreme Court may be, it must be made
before the plan for regional u~iiversities for Negroes can be of maximum
service to the South. The National Association for the Advancement of
Colored People opposes the program in the belief that once it is well established
it will lend weight to the arguments that segregation is not a denial of equal
protection.68 If 'a ruling that segregation is unconstitutional should be made,
it would of course lead to some type of complete reconstitution of Southern
schools. If the Court rules that equal but separate facilities satisfy the
requirements of equal protection then the regional program would not be
opposed as a factor which would tend to cause such a decision,
THE REGIONAL SCHOOL AND EQUAL PROTECTION
Assuming that the Court will uphold the constitutionality of segregation,
or that it will not have to rule directly upon that question in the near future,
does the plan for regional universities meet the requirements of equal
protection so far as the Negro is concerned? The answer to this question
depends upon (1) whether it is discriminatory to require one citizen to go to
a regional school to 'obtain training which is available to another citizen in a
public institution within the geographical borders of the state, and (2) whether
the interstate compact idea can be so utilized as to give the regional schools
a character which partakes of the nature of individual state institutions.
As to the first point, it is possible that the distance factor alone would be
sufficient to cause the Court to hold that it is unreasonable and therefore
discriminatory to require a Negro to travel from Texas to Tennessee in order
to get medical training while a white citizen can obtain like training in Texas.,
State courts have held that it is not discrimination to require a Negro child
to travel a greater distance to his school than he would have to travel to a
school for whites. 69 However, in United States v. Buntin 70 a federal court
stated that a Negro could not be required to travel an unreasonable and
oppressive distance, or be placed at a material disadvantage because of the
greater distance to his school. The cases agree that some variation in distances
to be traveled must be expected; the problem is as to when the variation
becomes unreasonable.71 Greater variation'would reasonably be allowed in the
67. See text to note 29, supra.
68. This attitude was evidenced at the hearings before the Senate Judiciary Committee
on the proposed compact for regional education. Nashville Tennessean, Mar. 14, 1948, p.
7, col. 7-8.
69. Dameron v. Bayless, 14 Ariz. 180, 126 Pac. 273 (1912) ; Roberts v. Boston, 5
Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849) (decided under a state statute similar to Fourteenth Amendment).
70. 10 Fed. 730 (C. C. S. D. Ohio 1882).
71. The relative distances in the Bunti case were 3 miles to white school, 5 miles toNegro school, and the court left it to the jury to determine whether this was reasonable;
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case of college students than in situations involving young children, and, under
modern conditions of travel and communication, any location within the
Southern region might be considered reasonable for persons who are ready
for graduate and professional training. In addition, the cases on the subject
have dealt with pupils who lived at home and had to traverse the distance
daily. A different situation is presented where the students live at the college
or university. In the latter case the distance to be traveled is not so significant.
Exposure to the elements, dangerous traffic conditions, and expenditure of
time are not factors where the individual lives on the campus.,
Another consideration which minimizes the objection of relative distance
as a disinctive feature of the regional school is that similar variations would
necessarily exist even if each state provided individual Negro schools within
its borders. The relative number of applicants reasonably requires more white
schools than Negro schools within the state, and this indirectly means more
convenient white schools. Therefore, if it would be sufficient to establish
fewer Negro schools within the individual states, the regional character of the
school should add little objection on the score of relative distances to be
travelled by the students.
As has already been stated, substantial equality of facilities is a funda-
mental requirement, 72 but it may not be sufficient. The possibilities vary with
the course of study. For example, it would seem to make little difference to a
medical student whether he studied in one state or another, so long as the
facilities were adequate; but a law student may derive considerable advantage
from studying in the state where he intends to practice. Instructors tend to
illustrate their points with local laws, and to pay special attention to local
cases and statutes. Opportunity to observe local courts in action, and contacts
with the bench and bar where one plans to practice may be of great value.
To'deny this opportunity to one student, while granting it to another may be a
violation of the equal protection requirement.
As to the second point-whether a regional school can be made to partake"
of the nature of an individual state institution-serious obstacles are encoun-
tered. What the equal protection clause demands in this respect is clearly stated
in the Gaines case, and reiterated in the more recent Sipuel case. In Missouri at
the time of the Gaines case there was no state law school for Negroes, although
such a school for whites was an established part of the state university. Under
a Missouri statute 73 the Board of Curators of the state university were
Roberts v. Boston, 5 Cush. 198 (Mass. 1849) (not unreasonable to require Negro to
walk one fifth of a mile farther to her school; Lehew v. Brummell, 103 Mo. 546, 15 S. W.
765 (1890) (not unfair to require Negroes to travel 3Y2 miles as compared to 2 miles to
white schools) ; Wright v. Board df Education, 129 Kan. 852, 284 Pac. 363 (1930) (not
unreasonable to require Negro child to go 20 _blocks to her school when a white school
was in her immediate neighborhood) ; see Note 103 A. L. R. 713, 714 (1936).
72. See p. 404, supra.
73. Mo. REv. STAT. § 9622 (1929).
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authorized to arrange for Negro citizens of Missouri to attend schools in
adjacent states which would offer them legal training, their home state bearing
the cost of tuition. Petitioner, a Negro, sought to compel the University of
Missouri to admit him to its law school on the ground that it was a denial of
the equal protection of the laws to compel him to go outside the state when
facilities within the state existed for whites. The United States Supreme
Court sustained this contention, saying:
"The basic consideration is . . . as to what opportunities Missouri itself furnishes
to white students and denies to negroes solely upon the ground of color.... By the
operation of the laws of Missouri a privilege has been created for white law students
which is denied to negroes by reason of their race. The white resident is afforded
legal education within the State; the negro resident having the same qualifications
is refused it there and must go outside the State to obtain it. That is a denial of the
equality of legal right to the enjoyment of the privilege which the State has set up,
and the provision for the payment of tuition fees in another State does not remove
the discrimination....
"Manifestly, the obligation of the State to give the protection of equal laws can
be performed only where its laws operate, that is, within its own jurisdiction. It is
there that the equality of legal right must be maintained. That obligation is imposed
by the Constitution upon the States severally as governmental entities,-each responsi-
ble for its own laws establishing the rights and duties of persons within its borders.
It is an obligation the burden of which cannot be cast by one State upon another, and
no State can be excused from performance by what another State may do or fail to
do. That separate responsibility of each State within its own sphere is of the essence
of statehood maintained under our dual system." 74
In the Sipuel case the Court phrased the requirement thusly: "The pe-
titioner is entitled to secure legal education afforded by a state institution." 7
The critical requirements of the two decisions appear to be that if fa-
cilities are offered to whites in state institutions as at present, equal facilities
must be offered to Negroes in an institution which (1) is located where the
laws of the state operate, that is, within its jurisdiction, and (2) is a state in-
stitution. True, the Court suggests that these requirements can only be met
by an institution which is located within the borders of the state, but the par-
ticular wording is not essential to the holding in the case, and there is no in-
dication that the Court has considered the possibility of a regional school be-
ing established. What the Court actually held in the Gaines case was that it
was not sufficient for the State to pay tuition in an out-of-state institution over
which the State had no control, and to which the State had no duty to con-
tribute. The Sipuel case held that equal facilities must be furnished in a state
institution.
Can a regional school possibly satisfy these two requirements? First, as
to the "state institution" requirement, it is obvious that if the language of
the court is interpreted to mean an individual state institution, then no re-
74. Missouri ex rel. Gaines v. Canada, 305 U. S. 337, 349-350 (1938).
75. Sipuel v. Board of Regents, 68 Sup. Ct. 299 (1948).
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gional school could possibly be sufficient. The proposed plans would, how-
ever, set up what amounts to a joint state institution. Each state has an equal
voice in the control of the school. 76 The amount of money to be contributed
by each state is not governed by the number of students from such state (as
'is true under the out-of-state tuition plan) but is fixed upon the basis of rela-
tive state populations. 77 Qualified students are admitted as a matter of right,78
rather than as a matter of privilege granted by a sister state. The individual
states hold a position as tenants in common of the beneficial use of the schools'
facilities. 79 All these factors certainly offer some reasonable basis for classify-
ing a regional school as a public institution of each of the participating states.80
The language of the Gaines case speaks of the several obligations of the states,
but it would not necessarily follow from the fact that the obligation is several,
that the fulfillment may not be accomplished by joint action.
May such a school be regarded as "within the jurisdiction" of the various
states? It has been held that jurisdiction may extend beyond the territorial
limits of sovereignty,8' and it would seem that it is definitely within the power
of the states to establish an area wherein all would have concurrent jurisdic-
tion.82 Commonly such concurrent jurisdiction is granted over the surface of
rivers which are part of a common boundary. The reason for the concurrent
power is usually that the difficulty in ascertaining the middle of the channel at a
given moment leads to major problems of law enforcement on the rivers, and
it has been said that such jurisdiction does not apply to objects of a permanent
nature, such as islands, bridges, etc., because their position with respect to the
true boundary can easily be ascertained, and the reason for concurrent jurisdic-
76. Appendix, infra, 1[ 5.
77. Id. at 9.
78. This right is a qualified one, rather than absolute. That is, a person may meet
the minimum" requirements for admission, but if facilities are not available to accommo-
date all who apply, relative rank may be used to determine who shall be admitted. This
situation is commonly met ii the medical schools.
79. "Title to all such educational institutions ... and to all properties and facilities used
in connection therewith shall be vested in said Board as the agency of and for the use
and benefit of the said states and the citizens thereof .. " Appendix, infra, ff 6.
80. Under the terms of the compact it is not'necessary that all the states be parties
in the establishment of a particular school. Any two or more may set up such a school
provided the Board approves. Id. at ff 8.
81. Wedding v. Meyler, 192 U. S. 573 (1904) (statutory jurisdiction of State of
Indiana over entire surface of Ohio river opposite State of Kentucky). But cf. Morgan v.
Virginia, 328 U. S. 373, 386 (1946) (segregation on interstate carrier) (". . . no state
law can reach beyond its own border .... ") ; and Sanders v. St. Louis & N. 0. Anchor
Line, 97 Mo. 26, 10 S. W. 595, 597 (1889) (Missouri jurisdiction over torts on Mississippi
river near Illinois shore) ("The jurisdiction of a state is co-extensive with its sovereign-
ty.").
82. Wedding v. Meyler, supra note 81; In re Mattson, 69 Fed. 535, 540 (C. C. D. Ore.
1895) (concurrent jurisdiction of Oregon and Washington over Columbia river) ; Gil-
bert v. Moline Water Power & Mfg. Co., 19 Iowa 319 (1866) (Iowa Court has no
jurisdiction to abate nuisance on Illinois side of Mississippi river) ; State v. Nielsen, 51
Ore. 588, 95 Pac. 720 (1908) (concurrent jurisdiction of Oregon and Washington over
Columbia river).
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tion fails.83 However, this rationale would not apply to an area over which
concurrent jurisdiction was established for an entirely different reason. Pos-
sibly the closest analogy to the proposed compact is that which established the
Port of New York Authority.84 The states of New Jersey and New York es-
tablished the Port Authority for the purpose of improving the operation of, the
facilities of the New York port area, and control of the area was placed in
the hands of a joint board of managers. When this action was attacked as es-
tablishing an unauthorized political subdivision, the New York court said:
"It is obvious that the outlining of a district for the purpose of applying therein
certain rules and regulations under which the citizens of the whole state and of an
adjoining state will reap an unqualified and direct benefit is not the creation of a
political subdivision. No power to tax is granted, no governmental authority is
bestowed.... The sole power granted to the joint board of managers .. . is to do
only what any private corporation may do,... not for private gain, but for the welfare
and progress of the community." 85
This same reasoning would logically apply to the education compact.
However, such a point goes to the constitutionality of the compact per se, and
not to its sufficiency under the equal protection clause. It may well be that,
even if the Court holds that the regional school is a "state" institution, it may
also hold that such a school is not withifi the jurisdiction of the state in the
sense in which "jurisdiction" was used in the Gaines case. The laws of each
of the states would operate upon the regional institution, but in an indirect
manner. A state legislature can pass laws which may immediately affect its in-
dividual'state schools; no such power exists where the regional schools are
concerned. Legislative control over such schools must be exercised in con-
cert with, action by the other states concerned, and upon recommendation of
the Board of Control.8 6 This may well be the point on which the decision of
the Court on the question of equal protection will turn.
It is possible that the Court would consider an argument that the regional
school meets the requirements of equal protection because it is supported by
taxation levied in the same way and within the same territorial limits as exist
for the white schools; that the schools are established by acts of the state
legislature in the same way that the white state schools are established; and
that the protection of state laws administered by the Board of Control for
South'ern Regional Education is equivalent to the protection of such laws
administered by the state Board of Education.
The purpose of the foregoing paragraphs is not to argue that the regional
83. Gilbert v. Moline Water Power & Mfg. Co., 19 Iowa 319, 322 (1866).
84. For the history of this compact see Frankfurter and Landis, supra note 18 at 746;
Note, 34 VA. L. R v. 64, 70 (1948).
85. City of New York v. Willcox, 115 Misc. 351, 189 N. Y. Supp. 724, 727 (Sup. Ct.
1921).
86. Appendix, infra, f111 5, 6.
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schools do meet the requirements of the Gaines and Sip uel cases. It is rather
to show that the Court could reach such a conclusion if it feels that the pro-
jected plan in fact offers substantially equal schools. As has already been
stated, the Court has tended to consider factual results rather than technicAl
and sometimes meaningless 'legal considerations in reaching 'its decisions. If
this tendency manifests itself when the Court passes upon the regional school
in the light of the equal protection requirement, it may well be that the Court
will hold that the requirement is satisfied. It is noteworthy that the project is
not an attempt on the part of the Southern states to deny to the Negro an edu-
cational opportunity. The spirit of this plan is radically different from the
various schemes devised to deny the Negro the right to participate in his \own
government.87 It represents a real advance over existing opportunities for the
Negro. If it had been established before the Sipuel case occasioned renewed
publicity on the problem, it might well have been hailed from all sides as a
statesmanlike project instead of being attacked in some quarters as an attempt
to perpetuate discrimination.8 8 The Court, then, may let nice questions of
theoretical equality yield to the concrete facts of substantially -equal oppor-
tunity as established by the regional plan.
POssIBLE ALTERNATIVE SOLUTIONS
If the Court holds that the regional schools will not meet the requirements
of the equal protection clause so long as white state universities exist, this
need not mean the end of the program. One solution would be to place all pro-
fessional schools in the South on a regional basis as provided in the compact.
This would remove all question as to the equality of oppoftunity provided by
the states, save for the possible question arising from the variations in the dis-
tances which a particular student would have to travel to reach his segregated
school. 89
Even if' the present white state schools retain their individual state
character, and if the regional school for Negroes is held not to be equal in
opportunity, the regional school ny still prosper. If enforced segregation
were declared unconstitutional, or if the states voluntarily opened their uni-
87. See note 45 supra.
88. The regional plan is not a sudden device to attempt to "get around" the Sipuel
case. It was suggested as early as 1934 by the then Governor-Elect of South Carolina,
Olin D. Johnson, at a conference of Southern Governors and President Franklin D.
Roosevelt at Warm Springs, Ga. Letter from Senator Olin D. Johnson to VAxiDERBuT
LAW REvmw, March 23, 1948. The sudden revival of the plan was not prompted by the
Sipuel case, but rather by the dire financial straits of Meharry Medical College, Nash-
ville, Tennessee. Nashville Tennessean, March 31, 1948, p. 13, col. 1-2. The importance of
Meharry to Negro medicine is discussed in Pringle & Pringle, The Color Line in Medicine,
220 SAT. Eva. POST, No. 30, pp. 15, 70 (Jan. 24, 1948). Gov. McCord of Tennessee took
the active lead in arranging for the Southern states to take over Meharry, and this college
is the only one specifically mentioned in the compact. Appendix, infra, 1 2.
89. See text to notes 69-70, supra.
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versities to both races, these universities could not accept all Negroes who
were qualified. It is common knowledge that only a small percentage of quali-
fied applicants can be admitted into the various medical schools of the nation.
These schools naturally select the applicants with the best scholastic records.
Past discrimination against the Negro in his undergraduate opportunity is
certain to handicap him in his contest with the white applicants for the limited
space available in the state universities. The excess number, duly qualified
but relatively too low on the list to gain admission to the state university,
would still be able to get their training in the regional school, provided that
the Negroes were not still confronted with whites who would tend to squeez'e
them out of the regional schools also.90 If segregated regional schools existed,
this danger would not be present. And, besides those who failed to gain ad-
mission to the state schools there would be many of those who could have been
admitted who would prefer to attend the regional school where they could
be a part of the school activities, both professional and social. Only a theorist
wholly divorced from reality would deny that the Negro student who enrolls
in a previously segregated S6uthern "white" school will find himself set apart
socially. That such a situation might gradually disappear would be small
comfort to the individual who was faced with it in its most extreme form.0 '
Thus, so long as the regional segregated school is not declared to be uncon-
stitutional per se, it may flourish as equal opportunity in fact, to go along
with the equality in theory which the Stipreme Court may establish by hold-
ing that Negroes must be admitted to an individual state institution or to the
existing white universities. Opposition to such a course might arise from the
Negro organizations which have led the fights through the courts, but this
opposition need not defeat the development of the regional schools to a position
of prestige and importance in the area. Such a development would save the
legal right of the Negro, provide him with educational opportunity, and mini-
mize the friction which will inevitably follow any substantial disruption of
the established racial pattern in the South. Should such a system develop it
might also solve many of the problems of federal aid to state education, since
the right of the Negro to schooling within the state would be recognized by all
90. In the Northern medical schools which have no segregation rule, the percentage
of Negro students is almost negligible. Eighty-five colored students are currently en-
rolled in twenty Northern and Western schools as against 25,000 whites. Eighteen Ne-
groes have graduated from Philadelphia's five medical schools in the last 27 years. Fewer
than 50 Negroes graduated from the medical schools in New York City from 1920 to
1942. Pringle & Pringle, supra note 88, at 16.
91. In the Sweatt case the trial court refused to admit evidence that Donald Murray,
the Negro man who was admitted to the law school of the University of Maryland as a re-
sult of the case of Pearson v. Murray, 169 Md. 478, 182 Atl. 590 (1936), was not os-
tracized or segregated by his fellow students. This ruling was upheld on appeal. Sweatt
v. Painter, No. 9684, Tex. Civ. App. (1948). Some twenty persons are now studying law
in the University of Maryland as a result of the Murray case. Levin, The Legal Basisfor Segregated Schools in Maryland, 16 J. oF NEGRO ED. 491 (1947).
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concerned, and there would be nothing except a social bar to the realization of
full equality. The opposition of the Negro to laws which deny him the oppor-
tunity for equality is understandable and in fairness cannot be condemned.
The insistence upon the destruction of social differentiations by means of
legislation or judicial interpretation may be open to vigorous objection on the
part of those whose sense of fairness and history is mature.
CLYDE L. BALL
Appendix
[11 WHEREAS, The States who are parties hereto have during the past
several years conducted careful investigation looking toward the establishment
and maintenance of jointly owned and operated regional educational institu-
tions in the Southern States in the professional, technological, scientific,
literary and other fields, so as to provide greater educational advantages and
facilities for the citizens of the several States who reside within such region;
and
[2] WHEREAS, Meharry Medical College of Nashville, Tennessee, has
proposed that its lands, buildings, equipment, and the net income from its
endowment be turned over to the Southern States, or to an agency acting in
their behalf, to be operated as a regional institution for medical, dental and
nursing education upon terms and conditions to be hereafter agreed upon
between the Southern States and Meharry Medical College, which proposal,
because of the present financial condition of the institution, has been approved
by the said States who are parties hereto; and
[3] WHEREAS, The said States desire to enter into a compact with
each other providing for the planning and establishment of regional educational
facilities ;
[41 NOW, THEREFORE, in consideration of the mutual agreements,
covenants and obligations assumed by the respective States who are parties
hereto (hereinafter referred to as" "States"), the said several States do hereby.
form a geographical district or region consisting of the areas lying within the
boundaries of the contracting States which, for the purpose of this compact,
shall constitute an area for regional education supported by public funds
derived from taxation by the constituent States for the establishment,
acquisition, operation and maintenance of regional educational schools and
institutions for the benefit of citizens of the respective States residing within
the region so established as may be determined from time to time in accordance
with the terms and provisions of this compact.
[5] The States do further hereby establish and create a joint agency which
shall be known as the Board of Control for Southern Regional Education
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(hereinafter referred to as the "Board"), the members of which Board shall
consist of the Governor of each State, ex officio, and tw9 additional citizens
of each State to be appointed by the Governor thereof, at least one of whom
shall be selected from the field of education. The Governor shall continue as
a member of the Board during his tenure of office as Governor of the State
but the members of the Board appointed by the Governor shall hold office for
a period of five years except that in the original appointment one Board
member so appointed by the Governor shall be designated at the time of his
appointment to serve an initial term of three years, but thereafter his successor
shall serve the full term of five years. Vacancies on the Board caused by death,
resignation, refusal or inability to serve, shall be filled by appointment by the
Governor for the unexpired portion of the term. The officers of the Board
shall be a Chairman, a Vice Chairman, a Secretary, a'Treasurer, and such
additional officers as may be created by the Board from time to time. The
Board shall meet annually and officers shall be elected to hold office until the
next annual meeting. The Board shall have the right to formulate and estab-
lish by-laws not inconsistent with the provisions of this compact to govern its
own actions in the performance of the duties delegated to it including the
right to create and appoint an Executive Committee and a Finance Committee
with such powers and authority as the Board may delegate to them from time
to time.
[6] It shall be the duty of the Board to submit plans and recommendations
to the States from time to time for their approval and adoption by appropriate
legislative action for the development, establishment, acquisition, operation
and maintenance of educational schools and institutions within the geograph-
ical limits of the regional area of the States, of such character and type and for
such educational purposes, professional, technological, scientific, literary, or
otherwise, as they may deem and determine to be proper, necessary or advis-
able. Title to all such educational institutions when so established by appro-
priate legislative actions of the States and to all properties and facilities used
in connection therewith shall be vested in said Board as the agency of and for
the use and benefit of the said States and the citizens thereof, and all such
educational institutions shall be operated, maintained and financed in the
manner herein set out, subject to any provisions or limitations which may be
contained in the legislative acts of the States authorizing the creation, estab-
lishment and operation of such educational institutions.
[7] The Board shall have such additional and general power and
authority as may be vested in it by the States from time to time by legislative
enactments of the said States.
[8] Any two or more States who are parties of this compact shall have
the right to enter into supplemental agreements providing for the establishment,
financing and operation of regional educational institutions for the benefit
of citizens residing within0 an area which constitutes a portion of the general
region herein created, such institutions to be financed exculsively by such
States and to be controlled exclusively by the members of.the Board represent-
ing such States provided such agreement is submitted to and approved by the
Board prior to the establishment of such institutions.
[9] Each State agrees that, when authorized by the Legislature, it will
from time to time make available and pay over to said Board such funds as
may be required for the establishment, acquisition, operation and maintenance
of such regional educational institutions as may be authorized by, the States
under the terms of this compact, the contribution of each State at all times to
be in the proportion that its population bears to the total combined population
of the States who are parties hereto as shown from time to time by the most
recent official published report of the Bureau of Census of the United States
of America; or upon such other basis as may be agreed upon.
[10] This compact shall not take effect or be binding upon any State
unless and until it shall be approved by proper legislative action of as many
as six or more of the States whose governors have subscribed hereto within a
period of eighteen months from the'date hereof. When and if six or more
States shall have given legislative approval to this compact within said eigh-
teen months period, it shall be and become binding upon such six or more
States'60 days after the date Of legislative approval by the sixth State and the
governors of such six or more States shall forthwith name the members of
the Board from their States as hereinabove set out, -and the Board shall then
meet on call of the governor of any State approVing this compact, at which
time the Board shall elect officers, adopt by-laws, appoint committees and
otherwise fully organize. Other States whose names are subscribed hereto
shall thereafter become parties hereto upon approval of this compact by
legislative action within two years from the date hereof, upon such conditions
as may be agreed upon at the time.
[11] After becoming effective this compact shall thereafter continue
without limitation of time provided, however, that it may be terminated at
any time by unanimous action of the States and provided further
that any State may withdraw from this compact if''such withdrawal
is approved by its legislature, such withdrawal to become effective two years
after written notice thereof to the Board accompanied by a certified cop5y of
the requisite legislative action, but such withdrawal shall not relieve the with-
drawing State from its obligations hereunder accruing up to the effective date
of such withdrawal. Any State so withdrawing shall ipso facto cease to have
any claim to or ownership of any of the property held or vested in the Board
or to any of the funds of the Board held under the terms of this compact.
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1 [12] If any State shall at any time become in default in the performance
of any of its obligations assumed herein or with respect to any obligation im-
posed upon said State as authorized by and in compliance with the terms and
provisions of this compact, all rights, privileges and benefits of such default-
ing State, its members on the Board and its citizens shall ipso facto be and
become suspended from and after the date of such default. Unless such
default shall be remedied and made good within a period of one year immedi-
ately following the date of such default this compact may be terminated with
respect to such defaulting State by an affirmative vote of three-fourths of the
members of the Board (exclusive of the members representing the State in
default), from and after which time such State shall cease to be a party to
this compact and shall have no further claim to or ownership of any of the
property held by or vested in the Board or to any of the funds of the Board
held under the terms of this compact, but such termination shall in no manner
release such defaulting State from any accrued obligation or otherwise effect
this compact or the rights, duties, privileges or obligations of the remaining
States thereunder.
[13] IN WITNESS WHEREOF this compact has been approved and
signed by the Governors of the several States, subject to the approval of their
respective legislatures in the manner hereinabove set out, as of the 8th day of
February, 1948.
[SIGNATURES OF STATE GOVERNORS OMITTED]
